Has the creation of a separate sovereign investment institution made the country’s public capital more productive, or has it merely changed who manages it?
That is the question the Maharlika Investment Corporation (MIC) — its outgoing leadership and incoming stewardship alike — must ultimately answer.
What does it truly take to turn P75 billion of public capital into a genuine sovereign wealth fund? It definitely takes far more than moving money across statutory accounts, incorporating an executive board, and announcing interim profits.
The real test has never been whether Maharlika can print accounting gains, but whether it produces economic value and risk-adjusted returns compelling enough to justify plucking those funds from the state institutions originally tasked with financing national development.
Three years in, that justification remains troubling to locate.
On the surface, MIC’s performance for the nine months ended September 2026 looks presentable. It reported P2.41 billion in gross revenue, P2.18 billion in net income, and P2.85 billion in comprehensive income. Yet a forensic breakdown reveals an underlying architecture that invites hard questions rather than celebration.
Of that P2.41-billion top line, P1.65 billion — nearly 69% — was generated simply from interest on liquid funds parked in banks and short-term placements. Only P756.5 million came from actual deployed investments.